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accidents (which claimed the lives of 6,000 Vietnamese in 
the first half of 2005 alone). Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
do have among the highest numbers of mine and UXO 
survivors in the world, but most of these were injured 
during or immediately after conflicts that have now been 
over for decades. In Vietnam especially, the population of 
mine/UXO survivors is aging, posing a new set of health 
challenges for government agencies and non-governmental 
organizations involved in their care.
Nevertheless, there is a compelling case for continuing 
to collect information and provide assistance to new vic-
tims as well. First, there are still significant numbers of new 
deaths and injuries each year; since 2000, these have aver-
aged approximately 800 per year in Cambodia (with full 
reporting), 200 in Vietnam and 100 in Laos (with incom-
plete reporting). Cambodia ranks no. 3 or no. 4 worldwide 
in reported casualties, Vietnam around no. 10 and Laos 
between no. 15 and 20, depending on the year. Each ca-
sualty affects not only the individuals involved, but also 
their families and communities, frequently with devastat-
ing effects on family finances through medical bills, trans-
portation costs and lost income. Thus, while longer-term 
survivors may have adapted to their injuries, new survivors 
and their families, as well as the families of those killed by 
mines and UXO, face immediate costs and challenges.
Second, the historical circumstances of the Indochinese 
conflict offer clear moral reasons for increased assistance. 
The U.S. government and NGOs as representatives of the 
American people have a particular 
responsibility, given that the vast 
majority of remaining lethal ord-
nance is of U.S. origin, certainly 
in Laos and Vietnam, and also in 
eastern and central Cambodia. 
Among the populations most at 
risk are the poorest, ethnic mi-
nority groups and those living in 
remote areas—which are often 
overlapping categories. Indeed, mines and UXO form one 
of the obstacles these groups face toward equitable, sustain-
able development together with national majorities. 
What does this analysis suggest for mine action pro-
grams and the international donor community? First, 
reduction of risk—not area cleared or numbers of ord-
nance—should become the primary objective of all mine/
UXO action activities. In most situations, given limited 
resources, this means foregoing expensive site-clearance 
operations in favor of mobile explosive ordnance removal 
and small-scale, community-level clearance. Many interna-
tional agencies are already taking steps in this direction. A 
subsequent step, again being pioneered by several existing 
operators, is the formation of UXO-specific operating pro-
cedures, rather than simply applying anti-personnel mine 
terminology and techniques to what is in most places a dis-
tinctly different problem. This applies as strongly to mine 
risk education programs.
The regional workshop in Siem Reap also recommend-
ed closer cooperation in MRE and mine clearance among 
the Mekong subregion and neighboring countries, with 
specific emphasis on accurate data on mine/UXO con-
tamination and casualties. Where information is lacking 
or inadequate, additional field surveys and mine marking 
should be conducted to better target MRE interventions. 
The Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System 
(CMVIS) has proven to be an effective tool in monitor-
ing casualties and ensuring full reporting nationwide. Laos, 
which also has a national program with significant interna-
tional assistance, will implement a similar system, tenta-
tively titled LUMVIS, in late 2005 or early 2006. 
Surprisingly, given its size and level of development, 
Vietnam remains the most difficult of the three countries 
in which to gather and share information. The challenge in 
Vietnam is how to expand successful models of coopera-
tion in several central provinces to other parts of the coun-
try that are also heavily affected by UXO and landmines, 
particularly along the south-central coast and in the central 
highlands. A successful, proactive casualty information 
system need not be top-heavy or bureaucratic, but does 
require central-level support, assured funding, and inte-
gration with existing health and disability data sources. If 
these objectives can be achieved in Cambodia and Laos, 
they are certainly within Vietnam’s capacity as well.
To date, international donor funding for mine action and 
victim assistance has been spread quite unevenly among the 
three countries. Cambodia has received an average of $20 
million (U.S.) per year over the last five years, or roughly $2 
per capita. Laos has received $5 million annually, around 
$1 per capita. Vietnam has averaged $5–10 million, or 
about $0.10 per capita. This discrepancy appears likely to 
continue. For instance, Australia announced in July 2005 
that it will provide $57 million for mine clearance and vic-
tim assistance in the southeast Asia region over the next five 
years. Reports indicate the majority of this funding will be 
sent to Cambodia and Laos, though Vietnam will also be 
considered. There are doubtless political as well as opera-
tional reasons for donors’ funding decisions, but given the 
similarities in UXO contamination, tampering and scrap 
metal activities and risk profiles, a more regionally balanced 
approach would seem warranted. 
The regional workshop on mine/UXO risk education 
described above offers one model of increased cooperation 
across national boundaries without high levels of bureau-
cracy or organizing costs. Other activities currently being 
implemented include multi-country research projects, site 
visits from one country to another, exchange of experiences 
within international organizations working in more than 
one country in the region and formation of informal part-
nerships among national NGOs, who may in some cases 
receive funds from the same external donor(s). Of course, 
intergovernmental cooperation remains necessary and ben-
eficial as well. The more information publicly shared and 
the more stakeholders from various sectors participate fully 
in creative problem solving, the more quickly Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam will move toward becoming a mine- 
and UXO-risk-free region in the future.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 104.
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Destroying the  
                          Mother
of All Arsenals”
by COL George Zahaczewsky Ret. U.S. Army 
Although the much-publicized weap-
ons of mass destruction have not 
been found in Iraq, less has been 
said about what munitions were 
found there, the hazards they pres-
ent or the efforts of Coalition Forces 
to remove the stockpiles. This ar-
ticle gives a first-hand view of the 
perils in Iraq.
O n 20 March 2003, United States and Coalition Forces crossed the border into Iraq, initiating ground combat operations during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Almost immediately, they encountered 
vast stockpiles of conventional Iraqi munitions. Much 
of the ammunition was in pristine condition, while large 
amounts of other ordnance had been looted, scavenged 
or damaged during combat operations. It soon became 
apparent that a major effort would be required to secure 
and dispose of these stockpiles.
Assessing and Managing the Problem
The discovery of these “ammo dumps” was not unexpected. Preparations to deal with 
captured enemy ammunition were part of the initial campaign planning for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom that started in October 2002. What was not appreciated until much later 
in 2003 was the scope of the problem. Ground commanders quickly put together plans 
and manpower in an attempt to secure or destroy the enormous caches of ammunition 
their units were encountering. These well-intentioned efforts would eventually produce 
mixed results and, in some instances, amplify the problem.
Increased awareness but uncertainty of the magnitude of the captured enemy ammu-
nition (CEA) problem resulted in the United States Army Corps of Engineers requesting 
to conduct an assessment in June/July 2003 to determine if their existing munitions re-
mediation programs could bring aid. Specifically, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) 
sought assistance in the munitions collection process, the transportation of the ordnance 
to disposal areas and the operation of the demolition sites themselves.
Due to the perceived urgency of the situation, CJTF-7 wanted capability in place 
within 30 days of the assessment to begin reducing or replacing military personnel 
and equipment engaged in the CEA mission (now renamed the Coalition Munitions 
Clearance program). Combined Joint Task Force 7—the “customer”—wanted the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors to provide a “cradle-to-grave” service that 
could eventually be transferred over to Iraqi authorities.
Funding was provided to the Corps of Engineers on 28 July 2003 to commence 
CEA operations. USACE awarded several contracts on 8 Aug. 2003—one to the Parsons 
Corporation (Pasadena, Calif.) for $80 million (U.S.) to provide the logistical support for 
the overall effort, and three contracts worth $67 million each to the following unexplod-
ed ordnance contractors: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technologies (Knoxville, Tenn.), 
Tetra Tech-Foster Wheeler (Pasadena, Calif.), and USA Environmental, Inc. (Tampa, 
Fla.). The scope of work for the contractors included the following requirements:
•  Manage ammunition supply points/collection points (ASP/CP).
•  Perform demolition of unserviceable munitions.
•  Perform demolition of priority munitions as identified by CJTF-7.
•  Perform transportation of CEA from caches to ammunition supply points/col-
lection points or demolition areas as required and transport prepared demolition 
loads of CEA from ASP/CP to the demolition area.
• Perform surface unexploded ordnance clearances, booby trap clearances, disable-
ment of unconventional warfare devices,  site investigations, evaluations and re-
sponses in support of the CEA mission.
cAPTUReD eNeMy AMMUNITION OPeRATIONS IN IRAq
A Russian FAB-5000 M54 high-explosive bomb in the vicinity of Zakho, northern Iraq (August 2004). 
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Among the populations most at risk are 
the poorest, ethnic minority groups and 
those living in remote areas—which are 
often overlapping categories.
1
Zahaczewsky: Destroying the Mother of All Arsenals: Captured Enemy Ammunition Operations in Iraq
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2006
16 | focus | journal of mine action | 2006 | february | 9.2 9.2 | february | 2006 | journal of mine action | focus |  17 
•  Provide security for ASP/CP, transportation opera-
tions, demolition areas and living areas as needed.
• Perform minor construction at demolition areas and 
ASP/CP as required to support the CEA mission.
• Perform the above objectives at multiple sites in 
separate geographic areas simultaneously.
Contractors and USACE personnel began mobilizing 
immediately following the contract award, and advance 
parties arrived in Iraq on 28 Aug. 2003. During this time 
period, a decision was made to centralize CEA operations 
in Baghdad, alongside the CJTF-7 Engineer Cell (C-7) at 
Camp Victory near Baghdad International Airport. It was 
further decided that field operations would be based in six 
former regional Iraqi ammunition depots. Tetra Tech was 
tasked with establishing operations in the southern part 
of Iraq, while EOD Technologies occupied two locations 
in the central part of the country. USA Environmental 
set up its operations at two sites north of Baghdad—
one in the Sunni Triangle and one south of Mosul. The 
initial mission objectives for this contractor workforce 
were the following:
• Reduce and eventually replace active military forc-
es with USACE and contractor assets.
• Provide “cradle-to-grave” CEA support services.
• Maximize use of Iraqi labor and assets.
• Be self-sufficient by January 2004
• Facilitate transfer of operations to the Iraqis 
Munitions disposal commenced with EOD 
Technologies conducting a symbolic demolition op-
eration on 11 Sept. 2003, followed by USAE destroying 
30 SA-7 Strela man-portable surface-to-air missiles on 
20 Sept. 2003. Since that time, munitions disposal op-
erations—“demo shots”—have been conducted several 
days a week at the six sites. Depending on weather con-
ditions and local labor, demo shots sometimes exceeded 
150 tons per site.
Contracting Iraqi labor forces to assist in sorting, 
storing and destroying ammunitions increased the pro-
duction capacity of each site significantly. Often the 
Iraqi laborers worked at these depots at tremendous per-
sonal risk from insurgent threats.
Types of Munitions
CEA contractors in Iraq found stockpiles consist-
ing of every conceivable type of ammunition—from sea 
mines and naval ordnance in the south of the country to 
small arms, hand grenades, landmines, artillery and tank 
ammunition, rockets, and guided missiles all across the 
country. Much of this ammunition was virtually new, 
while large quantities were unserviceable and exhibited 
varying degrees of deterioration. An estimated 65 percent 
of the ammunition would require demilitarization due 
to its condition.
Several “surprises” confronted CEA contractors when 
they entered the storage sites; many contractors were dis-
mayed at the age and types of munitions encountered. 
Some of Saddam Hussein’s ordnance stores contained 
ammunition dated from 1944. For example, a large 
stockpile of bombs discovered in northern Iraq con-
tained some FAB-5000 M54, 5,000-kilogram bombs, 
aerially-delivered munitions deployed only from Tu-
16 and Tu-95 bombers, which were not found in the 
Iraqi inventory.
Another eye-opener for contractors was the large 
number of countries that had supplied Saddam’s arse-
nal—including Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, France, 
Italy, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden 
and the former Yugoslavia. Munitions from at least 19 
nations were uncovered during the inventories of the 
depots and caches.
Although the CEA depots established an extremely 
productive routine, the task confronting the 50 UXO 
contractors at each site was formidable. In October 2003, 
Coalition Forces reported they had located 6,444 muni-
tions caches, of which 682 remained to be removed or 
destroyed. Furthermore, over 100 of the remaining sites 
were deemed to be large (i.e., 100 munitions storage bun-
kers or warehouses in each). Coalition Forces recovered 
the cache sites and delivered the munitions to the regional 
depots for storage or destruction. Beginning in December 
2003, CEA contractors accompanied by either military 
units or private armed security forces ventured out from 
their depots and destroyed cache sites in place or relo-
cated the ordnance to their depots for storage pending fu-
ture disposal. Between September 2003 and April 2004, 
the contractor workforce (which by then also included 
Environmental Consulting Corporation of Burlingame, 
Calif., and Zapata Engineering of Charlotte, N.C.) se-
cured over 87,000 tons and destroyed almost 220,000 
tons of munitions.
Risk to Personnel
All this work was accomplished at considerable personal 
jeopardy to personnel. The most significant threat currently 
hindering all reconstruction efforts is a lack of security. CEA 
contractors were most at risk while traveling between sites. 
These movements were most often conducted in ground 
vehicle convoys. While traveling in convoy, the contrac-
tors were usually escorted by either military personnel or 
armed private security forces. Regardless, insurgent forces 
launched attacks and ambushes against these convoys. The 
most common methods of attack were roadside improvised 
explosive devices and small arms fire. Occasionally, the 
convoys would be attacked by vehicle-borne IEDs. As of 
the writing of this article, five CEA contractors have been 
killed in such attacks.1–5
To counter the threat of attack, Parsons Corporation 
bought factory-armored Ford Excursions; however, 
USACE encouraged them to purchase mine-resistant ve-
hicles from South Africa. Mechem and Regis Trading were 
contracted to provide refurbished Casspirs and Mambas 
(respectively) to transport UXO and security personnel 
from site to site. As of the writing of this article, over 
40 contractors involved in CEA operations have survived 
death or serious injury from IEDs and small arms fire due 
to the protection afforded by the Casspirs, Mambas and 
armored Excursions.
Indirect-fire weapons such as rockets and mortars 
are another form of insurgent attack. Many attacks 
mimic tactics employed in Afghanistan, where rockets 
are fired from improvised launchers with some incorpo-
rating a time-delay firing device to allow the insurgents 
to escape any Coalition counterfire. These attacks were 
common; between October 2003 and September 2004, 
Camp Victory (where the CEA operation was based) was 
struck 18 times.
One final, less frequent method of attack against CEA 
operations was direct assault against a worksite, and only 
one site endured a sustained ground attack by insurgent 
forces. On 10 April 2004, a large CEA cache site south 
of Mosul was attacked by a force of approximately 12 in-
surgents firing 57-mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades 
and machine guns. The ensuing firefight lasted about 45 
minutes, wounding one American and two Kurds. Exact 
casualties to the attacking force are unknown.
Safety Considerations
It should come as no surprise that safety is a crucial 
issue when managing munitions and explosives. While 
conducting CEA operations, particular hazards were 
encountered when personnel were exposed to propel-
lant, loose mortar fuses and munitions containing white 
phosphorous. The following comments are intended as 
“lessons learned” to promote a better understanding of 
munitions disposal and provide information related to 
safety in mine and UXO clearance operations. Hopefully, 
the newly elected government in Iraq will lead to a more 
stable and secure environment, allowing humanitarian 
and relief organizations to return. As these new officials 
travel about Iraq, they will be confronted with the hazards 
from explosive remnants of war.
Although thought by many as a relatively small hazard, 
propellant from artillery and tank ammunition proved to 
be a source of several incidents during operations in Iraq. 
These occurrences were due to the scavenged munitions 
storage areas that contained loose and scattered propel-
lant. The stabilizer in the propellant deteriorated and 
rendered the material extremely susceptible to the high 
temperatures in the country. Several incidents of spon-
taneous combustion occurred that resulted in personnel 
injuries and property loss. 
Several types of foreign mortar fuses proved especially 
sensitive to handling, whether they were loose or pack-
aged. One incident resulted in the death of an Iraqi la-
borer when he mishandled a loose fuse and it detonated. 
Subsequently, CEA contractors were instructed to use 
extreme care when handling any variety of mortar fuses 
that did not have a positive safety pin blocking the firing 
mechanism.
While propellant and mortar fuses are not normally 
considered to be overly dangerous ordnance items, white 
phosphorous has always been known to be an extremely 
hazardous item to manage. Its inherent nature, combined 
with the high temperatures in Iraq, which liquefied the 
material during daylight working hours, prompted a 
review of safety procedures but, unfortunately, was not 
enough to prevent at least one serious incident.
Adding to the inherent munitions hazards were many 
well-intentioned attempts to assist in the reduction of 
ammunitions scattered throughout the country. Many 
improperly trained combat forces attempted to destroy 
munitions stores by a procedure called “drop and pop”—
an explosive charge was quickly assembled, ignited and 
randomly placed (or thrown) into an ammunition storage 
structure. The resulting explosion would destroy approxi-
mately 20 percent of the munitions, but the remainder 
would be scattered throughout the area, presenting a for-
midable UXO cleanup problem. Additionally, one well-
meaning organization attempted to destroy stockpiles of 
Partially disassembled Russian 100-mm high-explosive anti-tank 
projectiles discovered with both the copper shape charge cone and the 
explosives removed (October 2003). 
The F-350 Ford pickup truck in which three security subcontractors died 
when the vehicle was struck by an IED consisting of an artillery projectile 
(25 April 2004)
A Casspir mine-resistant vehicle after it was impacted by a vehicle-
borne IED in the Sunni Triangle (December 2004)
A typical ordnance disposal operation de-
picting the placement of munitions, donor 
material and plastic explosive initiation 
charges (December 2003)
Turkish trucks destroyed by insurgents at a 
rest stop south of Mosul. The trucks were 
scheduled to pick up CEA at a remote 
cache site (April 2004).
A looted ammunition storage magazine 
south of Mosul (October 2003).
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gerous, particularly to personnel working outdoors dealing 
with explosives, propellants and metal objects. During July 
and August, average daily temperatures can range from 
110 to 125 degrees Fahrenheit (43 to 52 degrees Celsius). 
Propellant becomes very unstable at these temperatures, 
metal-cased ordnance becomes extremely hot to handle 
without gloves, and in some instances, explosives in muni-
tions begin to soften and exude. Large amounts of water 
were essential in CEA operations during the hottest part of 
the year, not only for hydration, but also in the event of a 
leakage of white phosphorous munitions.
Another environmental factor to contend with in 
Iraq is leishmaniasis, which is an infection in both hu-
mans and animals transmitted by sand flies (not fleas). 
Between August 2002 and February 2004, at least 522 
cases of leishmaniasis were reported among U.S. mili-
tary personnel who had served in southwest and central 
Asia. While treatment is available for this disease, it is 
far less painful and inconvenient to use N, N-diethyl-
m-toluamide (DEET) lotion or permethrin repellent to 
avoid being bitten by a sand fly.
Other environmental factors to contend with in Iraq 
are snakes and scorpions. There are five types of poison-
ous snakes indigenous to the country, several of which 
have venom that is fatal to humans. Of relevance to CEA 
operations is the fact that both snakes and scorpions are 
fond of shading themselves in stacks of munitions both 
outdoors and in ammunition bunkers and warehouses. 
No fatalities have occurred as a result of encounters, 
but there have been instances in which workers have re-
quired medical assistance after a scorpion sting.
Logistics
Prior to the current conflict, the Iraqi infrastructure 
was well-established with an extremely capable road 
network. Many supplies were shipped in from Kuwait, 
as well as some from Jordan as the intensity of the in-
surgency increased. The danger of transporting supplies 
that were obviously destined for Coalition Forces or ci-
vilian contractors created a very tenuous supply system. 
Many Iraqi, Turkish and Pakistani truckers were killed, 
injured or scared away because they were aiding in the 
reconstruction of Iraq in the post-Saddam era. This situ-
ation has made supplying CEA operations a formidable 
challenge.
Much has been written and discussed about the 
amount of ammunition that has not been secured 
in Iraq; however, little has been mentioned about the 
civilian CEA contractors who have accomplished a task 
never before attempted under fire. Their efforts have re-
moved thousands of potential IEDs and weapons from 
the hands of the insurgents, protecting Coalition Forces 
and innocent Iraqis who simply want to live free from 
the oppressive Hussein regime.
In addition, by undertaking the CEA mission, the 
U.S. government has demonstrated its support in elimi-
nating the hazards of explosive remnants of war. The 
United States will undoubtedly continue in this role as it 
moves forward in implementing the State Department’s 
new Weapons Removal and Abatement Services contract. 
These U.S. efforts will continue to properly dispose of 
explosive hazards and in the process protect not only in-
nocent civilians, but also the global environment.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 104
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ammunition but unfortunately spread almost 50 pounds 
of toxic material over the demolition area due to depleted 
uranium in the missile fragmentation warheads. 
When properly trained and experienced personnel 
are utilized in munitions disposal operations, munitions 
with unique hazards can be identified and separated 
for future disposition. During CEA operations in Iraq, 
contractors destroyed on average approximately 1 ton 
of assorted explosive ordnance with properly positioned 
donor material and one block of C4 explosives (1.25 
pounds).
Finally, another organization complicated the se-
curing and disposal of ordnance by instructing local 
Iraqis on how to disassemble certain munitions to re-
cover the valuable components, such as brass rotating 
bands, copper shape-charge cones and, in some cases, 
the explosive material. This was done to start a “cottage 
industry” in order to provide a source of income for un-
employed Iraqis. The precious metal was then sold to 
scrap dealers.
Environmental Threats
The environment also poses hazards to those not famil-
iar with the area. As most would expect, the temperature 
in Iraq during the summer months can be extremely dan-
A typical “demo shot” at one of the USA Environmental regional CEA 
depots. This particular shot disposed of approximately 175 tons of CEA.
Hidden 
in Afghanistan
By Khair M. Sharif [ Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan ]
O
ver 20 years of war have not only destroyed 
Afghanistan’s rural and urban infrastructure 
but also scattered landmines and unexploded 
ordnance throughout the country in urban and com-
mercial areas, towns, roads, irrigation systems and ca-
nals, and farms and grazing land.  
These hidden killers are an obstacle to resettlement 
for the millions of internally displaced persons and re-
turning refugees. UXO denies access to farm and grazing 
land, shelter, and water, and prevents the rehabilitation 
of infrastructure critical to Afghanistan’s development.   
To date, the quality ef forts by the Mine Action 
Programme for Afghanistan have accomplished 
the fol lowing:
• Survey of over 377 square kilometres2 of high-
impact mined area and 608 square kilometres of 
former battlefields
• Clearance of 315 square kilometres of high-impact 
mine-contaminated land and over 636 square ki-
lometres of battle area clearance
• Delivery of mine risk education to almost 14.8 
million people by direct or indirect measures
• Provision of technical refresher and management 
training to over 6,700 MAPA staff members
If we look at the summary impact of the above 
achievement, MAPA has made a remarkable contribu-
tion toward the following:
• Increasing food production, which has improved 
health and quality of life
• Increasing repatriation process, which has re-
duced external aid required to support refugees 
and IDPs
• Reducing casualties and fatalities, which improves 
the safety and security of Afghan families
• Increasing access for emergency, rehabilitation 
and development projects through clearance of 
access roads and clearance of areas in prepara-
tion for subsequent assistance projects
• Increasing employment opportunities within the 
commercial sector through increased national 
productivity as well as for employees within 
mine action non-governmental organizations
• Integrating more than 700 newly demobilised 
ex-combatants into MAPA as a part of the “Mine 
Action for Peace” initiative, done in direct col-
laboration with the government of Afghanistan
Despite the significant achievements summarised 
above, according to the Landmine Impact Survey, there 
are 2,368 impacted communities (about 8 percent of 
the estimated 33,000 communities in the country), 
of which 281 are high-impact (12 percent), 480 are 
medium-impact (20 percent) and 1,607 are low-impact 
(68 percent).1   
The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan 
comprises the United Nations Mine Action Centre 
for Afghanistan and its area offices in seven differ-
ent geographical regions of the country, as well as 
killers
An Afghan deminer clearing a collapsed, landmine-contaminated residential area.
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A deminer marks the safe lane after 
its clearance.
Years of demining and mine action 
operations have reduced the num-
ber of casualties in Afghanistan, and 
lives are beginning to improve. Yet 
about eight percent of the estimated 
33,000 communities in the country 
continue to be impacted and 12 per-
cent of those are considered high-
impact communities.1
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3. ISO 9000 is a set of standards for quality management systems that is accepted around the world. For more information about the various quality certifications, visit International 
Organization for Standardization at http://www.iso.org/ or Simply Qualify’s Frequently Asked Questions about ISO 9000 at http://www.isoeasy.org/faq03.htm.
Demining in Iran, Banks [ from page 8 ]
endnotes
1. EOD World Services is the services arm of E&I International. MAI is the E&I mine action company presently operating with several other E&I companies in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.
2. Most work in Iran is for a national client. International clients demand IMAS standards and international quality assurance/quality control companies to inspect work. 
3. For more information on IMAS, see http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005
4. Embankments are to contain flood water. Bunds are generally used to describe defensive positions, banks of earth and embankments. 
5. Banks-men stand on the bunds to watch for items of hazardous material that may be dug up.
Assisting Landmine Accident Survivors in the Thai-Burma Border Region, Matthee [ from page 11 ]
endnotes
1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997. 
 http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
2. While only governments can sign the convention, non-state actors can sign the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation 
in Mine Action through an organization called Geneva Call. Geneva Call engages NSAs to respect and adhere to humanitarian norms, starting with the anti-personnel mine ban. 
For more information, see http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm. Accessed Nov. 2, 2005.
3. Simple plumb methods use a plumb line, which is a reference line guided by a string or cord weighted at the end with a large weight known as a plumb bob. It is used to create a 
reference line for creating vertical lines.
A Regional Approach: Mine and UXO Risk Reduction in Vietnam, Laos, and cambodia, Wells-Dang [ from page 14 ]
Further Reading
1. Bottomley, Ruth. Crossing the Divide: Villagers, Landmines and Organizations. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway, 2003.
2. Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS). Monthly casualty reports, 2004–05.
3. Final Statement from Workshop on Landmine/UXO Risk Education in the Mekong Sub-region, Siem Reap, November 2004. Fund for Reconciliation and Development.  
http://www.ffrd.org/MRE%20Workshop%20Statement.pdf. Accessed Oct. 24, 2005. 
4. Fleischer, Michael. Informal Village Demining in Cambodia: An Operational Study. Handicap International-Belgium, June 2005.
5. Global Survey on Explosive Remnants of War and Mines Other than Anti-Personnel Mines, Vietnam and Laos chapters. March 2005. Landmine Action (UK).  
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/UKWGLM.pdf. Accessed Oct. 24, 2005.
6. Landmine Monitor, “Vietnam” and “Laos.” November 2004. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/vietnam.html,  
http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/lao.html. Both accessed Oct. 24, 2005. 
7. Moyes, Richard. Tampering: Deliberate Handling of Live Ordnance in Cambodia. August 2004. Funded by Handicap International—Belgium, Mines Advisory Group and Norwegian 
People’s Aid. http://www.thememorybank.co.uk/members/richard/Tampering%20-%20deliberate%20handling%20of%20live%20ordnance%20in%20Cambodia.pdf. 
 Accessed Oct. 24, 2005.
8. UXO Lao. Annual Report 2004, UXO Lao, P.O. Box 345, Vietiane, Lao PDR, Tel: (856-21) 414896; Fax: (856-21) 415766, E-mail: uxolao@laotel.com.
Destroying the Mother of All Arsenals, Zahaczewsky [ from page 18 ]
endnotes
1. Associated Press. (27 April 2004). “Oregon Worker Killed in Iraq.”
2. Associated Press. (28 April 2004). “Civilian Worker: Roadside Bomb in Iraq Kills Port Orchard Man.”
3. Cha, Ariana E. (14 Nov, 2003) “Peril Follows Contractors in Iraq.” Washington Post (p. A.01).
4. Tims, Dana. (26 April 2004) “The Weekend Death of an Oregon Man Highlights the Dangerous Duties being Carried Out by Growing Numbers of Private Security Contractors in 
Iraq.” The Oregonian.
5. Zeleny, Jeff. (2 Nov, 2005) “Obama-Lugar Proposal Targets Stockpiles of Conventional Weapons.” Chicago Tribune. Accessed Nov. 9, 2005.   
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0511020221nov02,1,1921189.story?ctrack=1&cset=true.
Hidden killers in Afghanistan, Sharif [ from page 20 ]
endnotes
1. This information is in the UNMAS Annual Report, 2004.  Visit http://www.mineaction.org/; accessed Nov. 30, 2005.
2. One square kilometre is approximately 0.386 square mile.
3. Afghanistan has also been a signatory of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons since 1981. For more information, visit 
 http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/500?OpenDocument; accessed Nov. 30, 2005.
Observations on Recent changes in Northwest cambodia’s Mine/UXO Situation, Simmonds, et al. [ from page 24 ]
endnotes
1. L1S is an abbreviation for Level One Survey that is commonly used in Cambodia. This is not to be confused with LIS (Landmine Impact Survey), which is in common use in 
most other parts of the world.
2. Bottomley, Ruth. (2001) Returning life to field and forest: Mine clearance by villagers in Cambodia. Journal of Mine Action, 5.1 p.13.  
http://www.maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.1/Focus/Ruth_Bottom/bottom.html. Accessed Nov. 22, 2005. 
3. Bottomley, Ruth. (Dec. 31, 2003). Crossing the Divide: Landmines, Villagers and Organizations. http://www.prio.no/page/preview/preview/9429/40814.html. 
 Accessed Nov. 22, 2005.
4.  Fleisher, Michael L. (2005) Informal Village Demining in Cambodia: An Operational Study. http://www.handicapinternational.be/downloads/Informal_Village_Demining.pdf. 
Accessed Nov. 22, 2005. 
 
The War Goes On, Vosburgh [ from page 27 ]
endnotes
1. In the Untied States, this conflict is referred to as the Vietnam War.
2. Vietnamese Ministry of Defense Demining Command and The Technology Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICO/BOMICEN).
claiming the Future, Sisavath [ from page 29 ]
endnotes
1.  Mennonite Central Committee Web site, http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/report/laos_appendix.html. Accessed Nov. 15, 2005.
2.  U.S. Bombing Records in Laos, 1964–1973. Congressional Record—Senate, May 14, 1975 (p. 14,266).
3.  Handicap International Belgium. “Living with UXO—Final Report on the National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR.” 1997.
4.  1 square kilometre is equal to about 0.386 square mile.
5.  The Safe Path Forward 2003–2013. April 2004. http://www.undplao.org/UXO%20stuff/Stratplan%20Res%20EngFINAL.pdf. Accessed Nov. 15, 2005.
6.  1 hectare equals approximately 2.5 acres.
Developing Alternatives: The Locality Demining Model in cambodia, Leighton [ from page 35 ]
endnotes
1. Richard Moyes in his report, Tampering: Deliberate Handling and Use of Live Ordnance in Cambodia (MAG, Handicap International-Belgium, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2004), 
recognises that deliberate handling occurs amongst the most vulnerable families with the least traditional economic opportunities such as generation of income through livestock 
or land ownership. For online text of this report see http://www.mag.org.uk/magtest/cambodia/Tampering.pdf. 
2.  Review of the locality demining model was undertaken by Pia Walgren for MAG.
3.  As observed by MAG Cambodia’s technical operations manager, Gary Fenton.
4. See work undertaken on village demining by Ruth Bottomley, HI-B. http://www.handicapinternational.be/downloads/SpontaneousDeminingInitiatives.pdf, 
 accessed Dec. 13, 2005.
Afghanistan LIS, Fruchet [ from page 38 ]
endnote
1. A Landmine Impact Survey, or LIS, is a community-based national survey that measures the extent of the impact of the landmine problem in a country, based on the number of 
recent victims, socio-economic blockages and type of munitions.
USAID’s Perspective: The Importance of Social and economic Developing Strategies for Humanitarian Mine Action, Feinberg 
[ from page 41 ]
endnotes
1.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
2. The Leahy War Victims Fund works on behalf of civilian victims of war and people living with disabilities. See 
 http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/lwvf/index.html for more information. Last updated May 5, 2005. Accessed Oct. 21, 2005.
3. Learn more about the United States International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics at http://www.usispo.org/. Accessed Oct. 21, 2005.
Mine Action and Development, Turcotte [ from page 43 ]
endnotes
1. From the 2004 Nairobi Declaration by States Parties to the Ottawa Convention.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997. 
 http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
3. Landmine Monitor Report 2005. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/findings.html. 
4. These individuals are often called landmine survivors. For a complete definition, see http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/intro/survivor, accessed Dec. 2, 2005.
5. On Sept. 18, 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/2, the United Nations Millennium Declaration. At the United Nations Millennium Summit, world 
leaders agreed to a set of time-bound and measurable goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against 
women. Placed at the heart of the global agenda, they are now called the Millennium Development Goals. The Summit’s Millennium Declaration also outlined a wide range of 
commitments in human rights, good governance and democracy. See http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
6. World Bank. “Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative,” Social Development Note No. 20, October 2004. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit.
7. Information on the Geneva Conventions can be found at http://www.genevaconventions.org/. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
8. Information on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects can be found at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/500?OpenDocument. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
Integrated Mine Action: A Rights-Based Approach in cambodia, campbell [ from page 45 ]
endnote
1. The Millennium Development Goals are eight goals adopted by the government to eradicate poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality, 
reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/Aids, malaria, and other diseases, ensure environmental stability and develop a global partnership for development, 
all by 2015. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Accessed Nov. 1, 2005.
How can economists contribute to Mine Action, Marsh [ from page 51 ]
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